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Labour market discrimination against former juvenile 
delinquents: evidence from a field experiment 
 
Abstract 
In view of policy action to integrate ex-offenders into society, it is important to 
identify the underlying mechanisms of the negative relationship between criminal 
record on the one hand and later employment and earnings on the other hand. In this 
study, we identify hiring discrimination against former juvenile delinquents in a direct 
way. To this end, we conduct a field experiment in the Belgian labour market. We find 
that labour market discrimination is indeed a major barrier in the transition to work for 
former juvenile delinquents. Labour market entrants disclosing a history of juvenile 
delinquency get about 22 percent less callback compared to their counterparts without 
a criminal record. This discrimination is heterogeneous by the occupation for which 
one applies. 
 
I. Introduction 
Former contributions have been giving evidence for a causal negative relationship 
between criminal record on the one hand and later employment and earnings on the 
other hand (Lott, 1990; Waldfogel, 1994; Grogger, 1995; Needels, 1996; Borland and 
Hunter, 2000; Western et al., 2001; Kling, 2006; Graffam et al., 2008; Holzer, 2009; 
Apel and Sweeten, 2010; Dominguez Alvarez and Loureiro, 2012). This finding is 
important as this labour market sanction for crime is an important component of 
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overall punishment (Holzer, 2009). These adverse labour market outcomes among 
former ex-offenders may have important well-being effects: unemployed are less 
happy (satisfied with their life) than employed (Dolan et al., 2008; Stiglitz et al., 2009; 
Helliwell et al., 2012).
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 Moreover, limited work opportunities may also encourage ex-
offenders to return to crime (Needels, 1996; Raphael and Weiman, 2007; Wu and Wu, 
2012). 
In view of policy action to integrate ex-offenders into society, it is important to 
identify the underlying mechanisms of the aforementioned relationship between 
criminal record and later labour market outcomes. Is the negative association between 
criminal record and later labour market outcomes fully explained by supply side 
factors such as differences in worker productivity, work interest and work networks 
between ex-offenders and non-offenders (Waldfogel, 1994; Kling, 2006; Holzer, 2009; 
Apel and Sweeten, 2010)? Or does it also reflect employer discrimination so that the 
adverse labour market effects of criminal record are at least partly out of control of the 
ex-offender? In this paper we identify hiring discrimination against juvenile 
delinquents in Belgium using a correspondence test. 
Former contributions have been giving theoretical grounds for and ethical 
elaborations on labour market discrimination against former juvenile delinquents. 
                                                     
1 Knabe and Rätzel (2011a) calculate that the well-being costs of unemployment are about two times 
higher than its pecuniary costs. The meta-analysis from McKee-Ryan et al. (2005) indicates that these 
well-being cost are higher for young people than for unemployed adults. Besides the impact of current 
unemployment on current well-being, there is also a “scarring-effect of unemployment” (Clark et al., 
2001): past unemployment reduces current levels of well-being. Knabe and Rätzel (2011b) and Lange 
(2013) explain this scarring effect by the fear of future unemployment. 
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From a theoretical point of view labour discrimination against ex-offenders might be 
consistent both with taste discrimination as induced by, for instance, customer 
discrimination, co-worker discrimination and prejudices about trustworthiness and 
with statistical discrimination as induced by potentially lower (average) levels of 
productivity among offenders (Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1973; Holzer et al., 2007). From 
an ethical point of view one can discuss the responsibility of the juvenile. (How long) 
should one hold someone responsible for criminal facts in the past? Some egalitarian 
theories “consider it legitimate to put individuals in such a situation that they may 
seriously suffer from their own decisions” (Fleurbaey, 2005, p.29). Holding people 
responsible for past choices means that those having worse employment opportunities 
as a consequence of a criminal background have no right to help. Such an approach 
can be criticised as being too harsh as it does not take into account how regretful 
someone is (or can be) about past decisions (Fleurbaey, 2005). We investigate the 
probability of getting hired (or the probability of discrimination) when someone is 
honest about this criminal past. When we would discover a lower hiring probability, 
the ethical question of responsibility and help (or not) becomes relevant indeed.  
Direct empirical evidence on labour market discrimination against ex-offenders is 
scarce. Recently, the sociologist Devah Pager identified substantial measures of 
unequal treatment based on criminal record in the United States (Pager, 2003; Pager et 
al., 2009a; Pager et al., 2009b). In his studies teams of actors were matched and sent to 
apply for low-wage jobs in New York presenting equivalent resumes and differing 
only in their (race and) criminal background. We complement their research results by 
means of a pure correspondence test, in the spirit of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). 
The advantages of using this method are discussed in Section II. Moreover, this section 
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describes our research design in detail. Section III presents our research results. 
Section IV concludes and discusses the (policy) implications of our results. 
 
 
II. Methodology 
Measuring Unequal Treatment by a Field Experiment  
Most former contributions on the relationship between criminal history on the one 
hand and labour market outcomes on the other hand are based on non-experimental 
data. These non-experimental studies focus mainly on earnings and/or employment 
differentials by criminal record based on survey or administrative data (Lott, 1990; 
Grogger, 1995; Needels, 1996; Borland and Hunter, 2000; Western et al., 2001; Kling, 
2006; Apel and Sweeten, 2010; Dominguez Alvarez and Loureiro, 2012). In general, 
they suffer from two important statistical problems: unobserved heterogeneity and 
sample selection bias. First, job applicants who appear similar to researchers (except 
for their criminal history) based on (standard) non-experimental data, might look very 
different to employers. As long as not all relevant variables taken into account by 
employers in making their hiring, remuneration and promotion decisions, are 
controlled by the researcher, no conclusive proof of discrimination can be provided. 
Second, it is possible that individuals with better economic outcomes – who may be 
more confident in their interaction both with interviewers and colleagues – are more 
willing to disclose their status as an ex-offender. This leads to an upwards bias of the 
measured outcomes of ex-offenders. In addition, the studies focussing on wage 
differentials may suffer from the non-random selection into employment of employees 
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with and without a criminal history. Wage regressions may understate the full effects 
of unequal treatment based on criminal history by leaving out the fact that potentially 
many applicants with such a history are barred from even earning a wage. In order to 
overcome these methodological problems, field experiments can be conducted. These 
experimental methods provide a powerful mean of isolating causal mechanisms. Two 
options are described in the literature: correspondence tests and audit tests (Riach and 
Rich, 2002; Pager, 2007).  
Correspondence experiments testing for hiring discrimination on grounds such as 
ethnicity, gender, beauty and sexual orientation have been extensively used and refined 
during the last century (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Petit, 2007; Rooth, 2009; 
Drydakis, 2011). Within these correspondence tests, pairs of fictitious written job 
applications are sent to real job openings. The two applications within each pair are 
similar, except for the single characteristic that is to be tested. By monitoring the 
subsequent callback, that is the reaction from the employer side, unequal treatment 
based on this characteristic can be identified. These field experiments have been 
widely viewed as providing the most convincing evidence of unequal treatment in 
hiring decisions (Riach and Rich, 2002). With a correspondence test selection on the 
basis of individual unobservable characteristics is eliminated since all the information 
received by the employer is controlled by the researcher. Thereby, strict equivalence 
between fictitious applicants is ensured and employer discrimination is disentangled 
from alternative explanations of differential hiring rates such as differential employee 
preferences and network effects. 
A drawback of correspondence tests is that they investigate the first stage in the 
hiring process only. Since only callback rates for first interviews are measured, one 
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cannot make statements about discrimination in the later stages of the selection 
process, let alone in wages or promotion opportunities.
2
 So called audit studies go one 
step further by sending matched pairs of actors to apply for jobs presenting equivalent 
resumes and differing only in the discrimination ground. This approach was used in the 
studies by Pager (2003), Pager et al. (2009a) and Pager et al. (2009b) in the context of 
hiring discrimination based on criminal record. However, recently researchers have 
been criticising this method based on various grounds (Heckman and Siegelman, 1993; 
Heckman, 1998; Riach and Rich, 2002; Weichselbaumer, 2013). A main critique is 
that audit studies suffer from the problem that it may be impossible to find and 
successfully train real-life job applicants so that they truly represent a perfect match. In 
addition, auditors may consciously or subconsciously be motivated to prove 
discrimination and adjust their behaviour accordingly in an interview. Last, from an 
ethical point of view, the time investment in respect of the employers is substantial in 
the case of audit tests.
3
 As correspondence tests circumvent the latter problems, we set-
up a correspondence test aimed at answering our research question. To the best of our 
knowledge we are the first to apply this experimental methodology in the context of 
                                                     
2 However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) argue that to the extent that the selection process has even 
moderate frictions, one would expect that reduced interview rates would translate into reduced job offers 
and lower earnings. Moreover, since job interviews are costly, firms invite applicants for an interview 
only if they have a reasonably high chance of getting the job. 
3
 For an in-depth discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of field experiments aimed at identifying 
discrimination in the labour market, we refer to Riach and Rich (2002), Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2004) and Pager (2007). For an elaboration on the ethical aspects of these kinds of experiments, we 
refer to Riach and Rich (2004). 
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unequal treatment based on criminal history.  
Our experiment was conducted between December 2012 and April 2013 in 
Flanders, the northern and economically more prosperous half of Belgium. Two 
fictitious applications of school-leavers, identical except that one mentioned a period 
of juvenile delinquency, were sent out to each of 486 vacancies for labour market entry 
jobs. All these vacancies were taken from the database of the public employment 
service of Flanders (VDAB), which is the major job search channel in Flanders. From 
this database, we randomly selected vacancies of private employers in three (middle-) 
low-skilled occupations (manual worker, barkeeper and nanny) and three (middle-) 
high-skilled occupations (electrical engineer, representative and social worker). 
Including several occupations rather than just one is important since by focussing on a 
single occupation, as was done in some of the aforementioned correspondence tests, 
the researcher may just pick an occupation where discrimination is large. Furthermore, 
by including on the one hand both jobs in which money handling is on average high 
(barkeeper and representative) versus low (manual worker, nanny, electrical engineer 
and social worker) and on the other hand both jobs in which responsibility for (the 
health and safety of) other people is high (nanny and social worker) versus low 
(manual worker, barkeeper, electrical engineer and representative), we are able to 
investigate heterogeneity in unequal treatment along these job characteristics. 
Construction of Fictitious Applications 
We created two template types (Type ‘A’ and Type ‘B’) of resumes and cover letters 
for each of the six occupations listed earlier in this section, each matching the general 
requirements of these occupations. Type A and Type B applications were, at the level 
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of the occupation, identical in all job-relevant characteristics but differed in inessential 
details and in lay-out. Several example applications of the VDAB, with different fonts 
and layouts, were used and calibrated for our purposes, so that our applications were 
realistic and representative.  
All fictitious applicants were single males, born, living and studying in one of the 
suburbs of Antwerp, the largest city of Flanders. Low-educated school-leavers were 18 
years old and high-educated school-leavers were 21 years old. They all graduated from 
the same type of school, with a comparable reputation, in June 2012. None of the 
applicants experienced grade retention. The low-educated applicants applying for the 
occupations of manual worker, barkeeper and nanny held a secondary education 
degree in mechanics, tourism and health and welfare sciences respectively. The high-
educated applicants applying for the occupations of electrical engineer, representative 
and social worker held a professional bachelor in electronics, business administration 
and social work.
4
 
In addition we added to all applications the following features: Belgian nationality, 
Dutch mother tongue, adequate French and English language skills, driving licence, 
computer skills and summer employment experience. The cover letters indicated a 
person who was highly motivated and well organised. For the high-skilled applicants, 
sports club membership and student leadership were also added. Finally, we appended 
a fictitious postal address (based on real streets in middle-class neighbourhoods) and a 
date of birth to all applications. The resume and cover letter templates are available on 
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 The former three degrees correspond to the ISCED 3 level, the latter three to the ISCED 5 level. 
ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education. 
9 
request. 
Revelation of Juvenile Delinquency 
In Belgium, the anti-discrimination law (2007) stipulates some prohibited grounds for 
unequal treatment such as gender, race, age and sexual orientation. Having a criminal 
background is not legally recognised as a prohibited ground, which implies that the 
legislation “allows” rejecting someone on the basis of a criminal background. Some 
protection is offered as the applicant is not obliged to mention his criminal past to his 
future employer. Juvenile delinquency is registered in the Central Criminal Register 
but does not appear on the extract from the municipal criminal register (an extract that 
the employer can ask for). Information from the Central Criminal Register cannot be 
shown to anybody unless the person in question grants permission.
5
 
We sent two applications, one of Type A and one of Type B, to each selected 
vacancy. In one member of each pair the applicant disclosed a history of juvenile 
delinquency. This was done by including the following clause in the cover letter: “In 
view of a trustful collaboration I wish to report that during my secondary education 
career I spent one year at an open detention centre
6
 because of juvenile delinquency. 
However, this period is for me a thing of the past and I have a certificate of good 
conduct”. The fact that we mentioned an “open” detention centre is important in view 
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 There are exceptions for certain public functions. 
6
 Placement in an open detention centre is only possible from the age of 12 years on, for specific 
situations stipulated by law: (1) crimes that if they were committed by adults would cause an 
imprisonment of at least three years or (2) an act categorised as assault and battery (Van Rumst, 2007). 
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of the school career without grade retention included in the applications. Besides, 
underlining that the applicant had a certificate of good conduct was needed as lacking 
this certificate could give the employer an objective ground (in the present) to reject 
this applicant. In what follows we will point at this applicant as the “former juvenile 
delinquent”. 
In the other member of each pair, we did not mention any information related to 
criminal record. In what follows we will point at this applicant as the “control 
applicant”. Of course, this presumably “clean” applicant could also be an ex-offender 
in disguise who did not want to disclose his criminal record. Therefore, the comparison 
of the former juvenile delinquent and the control applicant actually identifies the costs 
associated with disclosing the status of former youth delinquent. 
In order to eliminate any possible effect on callbacks of the application type, we 
alternately assigned the clause disclosing juvenile delinquency to the Type A and Type 
B applications. Subsequently, we sent the resulting combinations in an alternating 
order to the employers, each time with about 24 hours in between. 
Measurement of Callback 
We registered two email addresses and mobile phone numbers, one for the individual 
without revealed juvenile delinquency and one for the individual with revealed 
juvenile delinquency.
7
 All applications were sent to the employer by email. In order to 
                                                     
7 We chose “Simon De Boeck” and “Bert Vandaele” as the names of the (low- respectively high-
educated) control applicants and “Dieter Van Acker” and “Kristof De Muynck” as the names of the 
former juvenile delinquents. We checked that these names did not represent a difference in socio-
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avoid detection, we applied to no more than one vacancy from the same employer. 
Callbacks were received by telephone voicemail or email. The content of the 
responses is available on request. Since we included postal addresses with a 
nonexistent street number in the applications, we could not measure callback by 
regular mail. However, several human resource managers confirmed that nowadays 
employers rarely, if ever, invite job applicants by regular mail for selection interviews. 
To minimise inconvenience to the employers, we immediately declined invitations to 
job interviews. All callbacks received later than 30 days after sending out the 
application were discounted (this, however, turned out to be an unnecessary restriction 
since we hardly received any positive callback after 30 days). In line with former 
correspondence experiments aimed at identifying hiring discrimination based on other 
grounds than criminal history, we define positive callback as the situation in which the 
applicant gets an invitation for a job interview, an alternative job proposal or the 
request to provide more information or to contact the recruiter.  
 
III. Results 
Positive callback by criminal record 
Table 1 presents our main statistical results based on the experimental dataset. In line 
with Riach and Rich (2002), we provide the reader with two statistical measures: the 
                                                                                                                                                         
economic background based on a study linking the (suffix of the) name Dutch speaking parents choose 
for their children with their (own) wage (Bloothooft and Onland, 2011). 
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net discrimination rate and the positive callback ratio. Since two applications were sent 
to each vacancy there are four possible outcomes: (i) positive callback for neither 
applicant, (ii) positive callback for both applicants, (iii) positive callback only for the 
control applicant and (iv) positive callback only for the former juvenile delinquent 
applicant. Overall, Panel A of Table 1 shows that in 105 of the 486 vacancies at least 
one applicant received a positive callback. 39 cases resulted in a positive callback for 
just the control applicant and 20 for the former juvenile delinquent only. The net 
discrimination rate is calculated by reducing the number of applications for which the 
control applicant was preferred by the number of applications for which the former 
juvenile delinquent applicant was preferred and this difference is then divided by the 
number of application pairs in which at least one received a positive callback. Overall 
this net discrimination rate is 0.18. Based on a standard χ2-test, the hypothesis that both 
applicants were equally often treated unfavourably is rejected. In about one out of five 
applications for which at least one candidate got a positive callback, the applicants 
disclosing a period of juvenile delinquency could expect to encounter discriminatory 
acts. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
The positive callback ratio is obtained by dividing the percentage of applications 
for which control applicants received a positive callback by the corresponding 
percentage for the former juvenile delinquent applicants. The value for this statistic 
presented in Table 1 (Panel A) confirms the finding based on the net discrimination 
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rate. Overall, the positive callback rate is 0.17
8
 for control applicants and 0.14 for 
former juvenile delinquents. The resulting positive callback ratio is 1.29, indicating 
that the control applicants got 29% more positive callback compared with their 
counterparts not revealing a criminal history. This ratio is significantly different from 
one at the 5% significance level. In conclusion, overall, both the net discrimination rate 
and the callback ratio point at substantial levels of discrimination of former juvenile 
delinquents in the occupations tested in the Belgian labour market. As by construction 
observable characteristics are equal for both applicants for each vacancy, regression 
analysis leads to the same statistical conclusions. 
Heterogeneity of unequal treatment by occupation and gender of the recruiter 
Next, we break down the net discrimination rate and the callback ratio to the 
occupation level (Table 1, Panel B). Doing so shows that discrimination against former 
juvenile offenders is higher than average in the occupations of barkeeper and electrical 
engineer, and about average (but statistically no longer significant due to the small 
sample size) in the occupations of manual worker and nanny. For the occupation of 
representative, we do not find any unequal treatment. Last, for the occupation of social 
worker we find weakly significant evidence for positive discrimination towards ex-
offenders. We believe that this may be related to the fact that employers see juvenile 
delinquency as an experience that is relevant from the perspective of this job. If we 
aggregate the positive callback ratio over the low-skilled and high-skilled occupations, 
we get a higher ratio for the former occupations (1.54) than for the latter occupations 
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 0.17 = (46+39)/486. 
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(1.13). This finding squares with the general theoretical and empirical evidence for a 
negative relationship between unequal treatment in hiring and the level of education of 
the applicant.
9
 Moreover in our specific empirical setup, juvenile delinquency during 
secondary education is longer ago for higher education. This empirical finding, 
however, contrasts to some extent with Waldfogel (1994) who finds, using panel data 
estimations on administrative data, that the negative effect of conviction on income is 
especially important for those who are highly educated. 
Last, we inspect whether discrimination is heterogeneous by the gender of the 
contact person in the vacancy (Table 1, Panel C). While among female recruiters 
overall no unequal treatment is found, we find significant levels of discrimination 
against applicants with a background of juvenile delinquency in respect of male 
recruiters. This finding is consistent with Carlsson and Rooth (2007) providing 
evidence for higher levels of ethnic discrimination among male recruiters (compared 
with female recruiters) in Sweden. However, as the regression analysis in the next 
subsection will learn, we cannot reject that the difference in callback ratio by the 
recruiter’s gender is significantly different from zero. 
Regression analysis 
As, by construction, we randomised over the disclosure of former juvenile delinquency 
by the fictitious job applicants, regressing positive callback on this disclosure (and 
                                                     
9
 From a theoretical point of view Taubman and Wales (1974) argue that higher education can act as a 
prejudices reducing screening device. Recent empirical for this relationship has been given by Bursell 
(2007), Carlsson and Rooth (2007) and Baert et al. (Forthcoming).  
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vacancy and employee characteristics) leads to the same empirical conclusion as the 
one based on Panel A of Table 1. On the other hand, the occupation and recruiter 
gender variables may correlate with each other and with other vacancy characteristics 
and, therefore, the results presented in Panel B and Panel C of Table 1 may in fact 
reflect heterogeneity of unequal treatment based on juvenile delinquency by other 
dimensions. Moreover, due to the finite nature of our data selection, the occupation 
and gender of the recruiter variables may even correlate with the application type (A or 
B) to which the former juvenile delinquent was assigned and with whether his 
application was sent before or after the control applicant. Therefore, we further explore 
the experimentally gathered data by regressing, by means of a linear probability model, 
the outcome of positive callback on criminal background and various sets of variables 
which are included as such and in interaction with disclosure of former juvenile 
delinquency. The results of this analysis are outlined in Table 2. For reasons of 
comparability of the regression results, except for “juvenile delinquency”, all variables 
are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of former 
delinquents and, for the continuous variables, by dividing the result by the standard 
deviation among this subpopulation. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
First, in models (1), (2) and (3), we regress positive callback on former 
delinquency (model (1)), former delinquency, occupation dummies interacted with 
former delinquency and occupation dummies without interaction (model (2)) and 
former delinquency, dummies indicating the recruiter’s gender interacted with former 
delinquency and dummies indicating the recruiter’s gender without any interaction 
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(model (3)). By construction, the estimations presented in columns (1), (2) and (3) 
reflect those presented in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C of Table 1. For instance, based 
on column (1), we learn that revealing former juvenile delinquency lowers the chance 
on positive callback with about four percentage points, which squares with the 
comparison of the callback rates for “treated” and control candidates based on Panel A 
of Table 1 as mentioned earlier in this section. Furthermore, column (2) indicates that 
unequal treatment is significantly less to the detriment of former delinquents in the 
occupations of representative and social worker compared to the (reference) 
occupation of barkeeper. Second, in model (4), we combine the explanatory variables 
included in model (2) and model (3). This hardly affects the estimation results as the 
correlation between the occupations and the gender of the recruiter is rather low 
(Cramer’s V = 0.19). 
Third, in model (5), which is our benchmark regression model, we extend the set of 
independent variables included (as such and in interaction with disclosure of former 
juvenile delinquency). On the one hand, we include variables indicating Type B 
applications and applications that were the first one of the pair sent to the vacancy. On 
the other hand, we include sector dummies and the number of (comparable) jobs 
announced in the vacancy. Concerning the sector of the firm, we use the Statistical 
Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (“NACE”) at the 2-
digit-level.
10
 Introducing these variables lowers the significance of the interactions 
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 The sector code was, based on the name and the address of the firm mentioned in the vacancy, found 
in the databases of the Flemish business magazine Trends and the Belgian organisation of Self-
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between former delinquency and the occupations of representative and social worker 
due to the correlation between the occupation and sector dummies – if the latter 
dummies (main effects and interaction effects) are left out of the regression model, the 
estimated coefficients for the occupation dummies are closely comparable to those in 
column (4). Furthermore, we see that unequal treatment was weakly less to the 
detriment of former delinquents when they applied with the Type B application, which 
is not a problem given our randomisation strategy. 
Fourth, in model (6) we substitute the occupation dummies by three dummies 
capturing characteristics of these occupations, namely the skill-level and the degree of 
money handling and responsability for other people. However, none of the regression 
coefficients for these variables interacted with former delinquency is significant. 
Therefore, we cannot confirm the descriptive evidence of less discrimination of former 
delinquents in high-skilled positions as provided in the former subsection. Fifth, in 
model (7) we extend the set of explanatory variables included in model (5) with a 
proxy of the size of the firm, i.e. the natural logarithm of the average number of 
workers (in full-time equivalents) employed by this firm in 2010.
11
 We were not able 
to obtain this proxy for each firm tested in our experiment, so that including this 
                                                                                                                                                         
Employed and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises UNIZO. In total, 57 sectors are represented in the 
data. 
11
 This proxy was obtained from the Bel-first database (Bureau Van Dijk), based on the name of the firm 
mentioned in the vacancy and/or its company number (found in the aforementioned databases of Trends 
and UNIZO). 
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variable decreases the number of observations in model (7) with 15%.
12
 As reviewed 
by Baert and Balcaen (2013), former contributions to the empirical literature on hiring 
discrimination reported lower rates of unequal treatment in large companies. In our 
case, however, the estimated coefficient for the firm size proxy has the expected 
(negative) sign, but is not significant. By including this variable, the interactions 
between former delinquency on the one hand and the occupation of representative and 
using a Type B application on the other hand become insignificant. 
Heckman and Siegelman’s critique 
As a final analysis, we test the robustness of our main finding, i.e. statistically 
significant evidence of hiring discrimination against job candidates who reveal a 
history of juvenile delinquency, using a heteroskedastic probit model. We do this given 
Heckman and Siegelman’s (1993) critique of previous correspondence studies. This 
critique boils down to the fact that not controlling for group differences in the variance 
of unobservable determinants of positive callback can lead to substantial bias. The 
solution to this problem is, as recently proposed by Neumark (2012), to adopt a 
heteroskedastic probit model, allowing the variance of the error term to vary with the 
minority status of the applicants, in our case the disclosure of former delinquency. We 
identify this heteroskedastic probit model, in the spirit of Baert et al. (Forthcoming), 
by assuming that the distance between the fictitious applicant’s living place and the 
workplace mentioned in the vacancy has the same effect on the callback of former 
juvenile delinquents and control applicants. From an empirical point of view, the 
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 This is the reason why we do not include this variable in benchmark model (5). 
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hypothesis that the coefficient for this variable is equal across both groups cannot be 
rejected on the basis of a likelihood ratio test. By running this heteroskedastic probit 
model, however, we find no significant difference in the variance of the error term 
between the two groups classified by juvenile delinquency history (the p-value of the 
likelihood ratio test is 0.90) so that the results presented in the former sections are not 
biased by the problem described in Heckman and Siegelman (1993). 
 
IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper joins in with former evidence for a negative relationship between criminal 
record and later employment. More concretely, we identify hiring discrimination 
against juvenile delinquents in Belgium in a direct way. By using a correspondence 
test we avoid the problem of selection on the basis of characteristics that are 
unobservable to the researcher using non-experimental data. Two similar applications 
of labour market entrants, one of both revealing a period of youth delinquency, were 
sent out each to 486 ads for jobs requiring no experience. Half of them were sent to 
jobs for relatively low-educated and half of them to jobs for relatively high-educated. 
Furthermore, as the sources underlying labour market discrimination might be more 
prominent for some types of jobs than for others, we distinguished between jobs with 
and without responsibility towards other people and between jobs with and without 
financial responsibility. By monitoring the callback from the employer side we find 
that labour market discrimination is indeed a major barrier in the transition to work for 
former youth delinquents. This discrimination is heterogeneous by the occupation for 
which one applies. Regression analysis shows, however, that this dimension of 
20 
heterogeneity is less pronounced after controlling simultaneously for heterogeneity by 
the sector of the firm.  
As labour market discrimination based on criminal grounds imposes collateral 
costs on ex-offenders, on their families and communities and on the society (e.g., 
direct and indirect costs induced by recidivism), one might consider to explicitly 
incorporate past criminal record as a prohibited ground for unequal treatment in the 
labour market, which is for the moment not the case in Belgium and many other 
OECD countries. However the issue of personal responsibility impedes that this is an 
obvious decision. On the one hand free individuals can make choices and have to bear 
the consequences of their choices. In this line of reasoning it should not be seen as 
problematic that individuals who opted for criminal activities end up with lower 
employment probabilities. On the other hand real freedom also implies the freedom to 
change preferences (Vansteenkiste et al., 2012). Fleurbaey (2005) therefore argues in 
favour of some “forgiveness” (i.e. the possibility to take a fresh start) for individuals 
who truly regret past decisions. As the absence of recidivism is an unmistakably 
indication that the preferences have been modified, there is no moral hazard problem
13
 
in this case. One could thus argue in favour of incorporating a past criminal record as a 
prohibited ground for unequal treatment as a “forgiving” policy.  
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 In some cases it is not possible to distinguish between those who really changed their preferences and 
those who say they have changed (see, e.g., Vansteenkiste et al. (2012) for an elaboration on this idea in 
the context on an unhealthy lifestyle). 
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Table 1. Data Description 
Occupations Jobs 
Neither 
applicant 
positive 
callback 
Both applicants 
positive 
callback 
Only control 
applicant 
positive 
callback  
Only former 
juvenile 
delinquent 
positive 
callback 
Net 
discrimination 
rate 
χ2 
Positive 
callback ratio 
t 
 (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)     
A. All observations 
All observations 486 381 46 39 20 0.18** 6.12 1.29** 2.49 
B. Heterogeneity by occupation 
Manual worker 79 67 2 6 4 0.17 0.40 1.33 0.63 
Barkeeper 80 63 5 10 2 0.47** 5.33 2.14** 2.37 
Nanny 80 56 6 11 7 0.17 0.89 1.31 0.94 
Electrical engineer 83 57 16 9 1 0.31** 6.40 1.47*** 2.62 
Representative 80 65 9 3 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Social worker 84 73 8 0 3 -0.27* 3.00 0.73* 1.75 
C. Heterogeneity by the gender of the recruiter 
Female recruiter 271 203 34 20 14 0.09 1.06 1.13 1.03 
Male recruiter 161 132 9 15 5 0.34** 5.00 1.71** 2.27 
 
Notes: The net discrimination rate is calculated by reducing the number of applications for which the control applicant was preferred by the number of applications for which the former juvenile delinquent 
applicant was preferred and this difference is then divided by the number of application pairs in which at least one received a positive callback. The χ2-test for the net discrimination rate tests the null 
hypothesis that both applicants are treated unfavourably just as frequently. *** indicates significance at the 1% significance level, ** at the 5% significance level and * at the 10% significance level. The 
positive callback ratio is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications for which control applicants received a positive callback by the corresponding percentage for former juvenile delinquent 
applicants. The t-test for the positive callback ratio tests the null hypothesis that the probability of a positive answer is the same for applicants from both groups. As two applicants contacted the same 
firm, the probability of the control applicant receiving an invitation was correlated with the probability of the former delinquent receiving one. Therefore, standard errors are corrected for clustering of 
the observations at the vacancy level. *** indicates significance at the 1% significance level, ** at the 5% significance level and * at the 10% significance level. The number of jobs with a male or a 
female recruiter does not equal the total number of jobs as for some vacancies we could not identify the gender of the contact person.  
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Table 2. Regression Results. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Juvenile delinquency 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.039** 
(0.017) 
Juvenile delinquency x Occupation: manual worker  
0.075 
(0.058) 
 
0.068 
(0.059) 
0.225 
(0.143) 
 
0.162 
(0.144) 
Juvenile delinquency x Occupation: nanny  
0.050 
(0.068) 
 
0.041 
(0.068) 
0.146 
(0.121) 
 
0.158 
(0.123) 
Juvenile delinquency x Occupation: electrical engineer  
0.004 
(0.056) 
 
-0.001 
(0.058) 
0.190 
(0.139) 
 
0.144 
(0.142) 
Juvenile delinquency x Occupation: representative  
0.100* 
(0.052) 
 
0.097* 
(0.053) 
0.260* 
(0.136) 
 
0.195 
(0.138) 
Juvenile delinquency x Occupation: social worker  
0.136*** 
(0.052) 
 
0.130*** 
(0.048) 
0.217* 
(0.117) 
 
0.212* 
(0.125) 
Juvenile delinquency x High-educated      
0.051 
(0.038) 
 
Juvenile delinquency x Occupation: money handling      
-0.018 
(0.066) 
 
Juvenile delinquency x Occupation: responsibility for other people      
-0.000 
(0.077) 
 
Juvenile delinquency x Gender recruiter: male   
-0.040 
(0.035) 
-0.036 
(0.035) 
-0.048 
(0.038) 
-0.048 
(0.039) 
-0.045 
(0.044) 
Juvenile delinquency x Gender recruiter: unknown   
-0.033 
(0.046) 
-0.025 
(0.046) 
-0.056 
(0.058) 
-0.053 
(0.058) 
-0.072 
(0.065) 
Juvenile delinquency x Resume type B     
0.103* 
(0.059) 
0.108* 
(0.060) 
0.094 
(0.064) 
Juvenile delinquency x First application sent within the pair     
0.005 
(0.059) 
0.002 
(0.059) 
-0.045 
(0.065) 
Juvenile delinquency x Number of announced jobs in vacancy     
-0.020 
(0.028) 
-0.025 
(0.030) 
-0.018 
(0.029) 
Juvenile delinquency x Log(average number of workers in the firm in 2010)       
0.017 
(0.018) 
Additional variables: Sector fixed effects in interaction with “juvenile delinquency” No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 972 972 972 972 972 972 830 
 
Notes: The presented results are linear probability model estimates with positive callback as a dependent variable. The variables that are interacted with “juvenile delinquency” are also included without 
interaction with this variable. See Section II and Section III for a definition of the variables adopted in the regressions. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, are in parentheses. 
*** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. Except for “juvenile delinquency”, all variables are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of former juvenile 
delinquents. The continuous variables are further normalised by dividing by the standard deviation among the subpopulation of former juvenile delinquents. 
